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REGULATION AND RESPONSIBLITY F'OR
LAWYERS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Benjamin Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION

Deborah Rhode's sweeping reformist work, In the Interests of
Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession, provides the American legal
profession with equal measures of carefully honed facts, balanced
evaluation, and realistic agendas for change. Given the care with
which it has been written, and the detail in which it is enmeshed, one
cannot do justice to it by singling out broad themes and dwelling upon
them. Nevertheless, that is what I shall do.
There are two of Rhode's contentions with which I take issue in this
essay. First, there is the contention that the legal profession needs
greater external regulation than it now has.' Second, there is the
contention that lawyers are responsible for the consequences of their
conduct.2
I. GREATER EXTERNAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS

Rhode's list of lawyers' wrongs is disturbing, but disturbingly
credible? On one level there is a variety of unacceptable, negligent
conduct that seriously injures clients and is typically never
compensated or sanctioned. At a second level, there is a list of
attorney behaviors that are regarded by the profession and the world
not only as unacceptable, but as unethical. This includes not only
exorbitant fees, but willful blindness to a client's wrongdoing, and
sometimes dishonesty with clients, colleagues, and courts. Finally,
there is conduct that the legal profession itself might deem adequate,
but that Rhode argues effectively is morally troubling. This includes,
for example, efforts to impeach witnesses one believes are telling the
truth, withholding of vital information on grounds of confidentiality,
manipulation of advantages in bargaining, availing oneself of statutes
* Professor & Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Fordham University School of
Law.
1. See Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal

Profession 144-47 (2000).
2. See id. at 213.
3. See id. at 3-16.
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of limitations on otherwise valid claims for which adequate non-stale
evidence is obtainable or possessed.
For all of these reasons, Rhode argues that there needs to be a
different system for determining the permissible bounds of lawyers'
conduct, and that a system of substantive ethic-setting and of
enforcement needs to exist independent of the largely self-serving
legal profession. Society should not tolerate this level of harmful and
essentially anti-social conduct by lawyers; it should require more of
them, and enforce those requirements independently.
A. Lessons from Medicine
Without commenting on the question of whether this level of
wrongdoing is occurring, I want to voice a note of skepticism over the
"more regulation" concern. Of course, there are many reasons for
being skeptical. A few examples include: the libertarian's concern
with reducing the cost of regulation; the liberal's concern with
reducing the chilling effect on legal rights of greater regulation; or the
taxpayers' concern with greater expense of the judicial system; and the
judges' concern with more litigation about lawyers' conduct. All of
these merit attention, but I would add a further concern that stems
from my experiences as a physician's spouse and as a Professor of
Torts. We have, in the field of medicine, an example of a profession
that has, in the past twenty-five years, faced a much greater degree of
external regulation than ever before. And have the results been
good? The answer remains unclear.
On the one hand, there have been certain salutary developments.
For example, the rate of increase in health-care costs has been
reduced, and the level of unexposed malpractice has decreased. More
information is provided than once thought appropriate. Overcharging
for medical services has gone down to some degree. And the long
term prospect of ever-escalating, uncontrolled medical costs has,
arguably, been averted.
A downside has, nonetheless, persisted as well. Indeed, until the
tragic events of September 11, Congress had as its top legislative
priority federal legislation intended to undo the effects of changes in
our health-care system. The managed care revolution, ostensibly
aimed at bringing financial and quality controls to the profession from
outside the field itself, has presented extraordinary problems. Of
course, one might argue that managed care is privatization, whereas
Rhode advocates increased regulation, making the analogy inapt.
But, I think a broader view of changes in medicine suggests that a high
degree of caution is warranted.
In my view, possibly warped by overemphasis on torts, the changes
in medical care delivery systems in the 1980s and 1990s were the
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second phase of a movement that began in the 1960s and 1970s.
During those decades, several changes occurred in the medical
profession. First, physicians fell off of their throne. The privilege and
elitism that attached to the Marcus Welbys5 of the world was
inconsistent with the egalitarianism and the more deeply politicized
views of the 1960s. Hand in hand with these changes, the idea of suing
one's doctor became much more popular in the United States and
malpractice litigation mushroomed. As is well known, something of a
liability insurance crisis occurred in the 1970s. At this time, American
physicians began practicing much more defensive medicine, and began
seeing themselves much more as businesses that needed to structure
their contractual relationships with patients as cautiously as they
could, in many cases with an almost adversarial attitude.
It is neither original nor well-established to comment that the rise in
liability insurance rates and the increase in defensive medicine
sparked, in some part, the soaring costs of healthcare. Undoubtedly,
there were other reasons as well, such as the increased urbanization of
medicine and, particularly, the increases in biotechnology and the life
span. But, in any case, it is not a wild exaggeration to see the need for
managed care and reduced hospital stays and utilization review in part
as a response to the pendulum having swung too far in the direction of
mindlessly defensive medicine, which in turn resulted in part from an
explosion in liability. If this picture has an element of truth then it is
ironic, to say the least. For if it is true, then the increase in medical
malpractice litigation, and legal accountability was unfortunately part
of the cause of a structure that systematically ignored the patient's
quality of care in a spirit of efficiency. I conjecture that the following
occurred: as the malpractice and the insurance systems began to
supplant physicians' judgments of what ought to be done, physicians
began to lose their confidence and grip on how to practice in a manner
that was reasonable and safe. It is just at this juncture that it is
tempting to send in more legal reinforcements.
Having
overcompensated with law on the end of liability imposition, it was a
natural development to use legal structures-in this case privatized
quality review and managed care-to provide a balance on the other
side with a set of incentives against inefficient costly medicine. And
yet this set of external signals further weakened whatever internal
compass-a professional ethic of care, with all of its pluses and
minuses-physicians had. And now, having had state tort law
4. See Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees:
Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1
(1986) (discussing historical changes in health care cost structures, reimbursement,
schemes, and trends in controlling physicians' costs and patient access).
5. Marcus Welby is the title character of "Marcus Velby, M.D.," which aired on
the ABC television network from September 1969 through May 1976. Joseph Turow,
"Marcus Welby, M.D.," at http'/wwv.mbcnet.orglarchivesietv/M/htmlM/marcus
welby/marcuswelby.htm (last visited February 25, 2002).

1952

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

balanced by private contractual regulation and market mechanisms,
we find that these market mechanisms need to be counterbalanced by
federal regulatory legislation.
In my view, although I support
patients' rights legislation that, all tolled, resembles the Senate version
more than President Bush's, I believe the President is right to be
concerned that there will be costs to patients and risk of reduced
coverage for some, and if these costs do rise, many of them will inure
to the benefit of plaintiffs' firms. There is no reason, moreover, to
believe that this now multi-complex set of external signals will fortify
the internal ethic that once played a larger role in the profession,
arguably to the benefit of patients, doctors, and society at large.
Whether we should endorse such legislation now is, of course, a
different question than whether we are better off now than we were
before the malpractice explosion and all the cycles I have described,
and both questions are different than the question of whether another
path might have been the best. I am inclined to respond to the latter
two questions by saying that, in any case, physicians and patients alike
have sustained a deeply regrettable loss, and the society of lawyers,
clients, and the public should take a hard look before heading down
that path. To exaggerate, we have dramatically altered the balance of
social and professional norms, on the one hand, and legal norms on
the other. The legal and business structures have come to dominate in
an area once dominated by other norms. The obvious costs are the
tertiary costs of extra bureaucracy. Another, and widely noted, cost,
is the dissatisfaction of physicians with their work, and patients with
their relationships with doctors. But the most disturbing possibility is
that the quality of the medical care itself has dramatically decreased;
that there was an activity in which excellence was being achieved and
we pulled out part of the structure that made it work-much like
replacing educational institutions with distance learning, food with
vitamins and fat, sexual liasons with hard core pornography and
artificial insemination, and so on. Of course, the question of how
much this has occurred, and what advantages have been reaped
through it, are empirical questions, and I have not tried to answer
them. I am simply voicing a concern.
B.

Legal Regulation

Let us turn now to the legal scenario. Rhode wants more regulation
in law.6
She wants an expansion beyond our cloistered
professionalism. She wants more malpractice litigation and liability.
What are the analogous risks? I think there are several. Prima facie,
greater liability will make legal services costlier, and if we are talking
about levels of legal service that cannot be done without, then those
service costs will, in total, rise. It will bring the insurance industry into
6. Rhode, supra note 1, at 143-83.
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play in a bigger way, producing a higher level of tertiary costs for legal
services. More defensive law is hardly what we need. More litigation
is unlikely to ease the court access problems of the lower and middle
classes. Indeed, one of the greatest reasons for difficulty in access to
low cost legal services is that being a plaintiff's lawyer is an
increasingly costly business because of the crowdedness of courts.
Greater regulation and liability for lawyers will likely give lawyers a
different attitude toward their work. Their professional judgment
comes to take a different, and lesser role, as the law and the prospect
of liability loom larger. In medicine, few individuals are willing to pay
for their most exorbitant medical costs out of pocket. Realistically,
this means that if the insurance market caps the products that it offers,
then the expensiveness of services will likely have a maximum as well.
The same may or may not be true in law, where the universe of clients
is far more likely to be self-insured, and in any case less dependent
upon one-size-fits-all first-party liability insurance. Increased costs
from heavier regulation and liability, therefore, are more likely to
spiral higher and higher in law, and are increasingly likely to separate
well-heeled corporate clients from individual ones; obviously
attorneys with a choice of buyer are likelier to go for the former. In
short, it seems probable that increased regulation and liability are at
least as likely to drive up the costs of legal services, and to segment
the market further based on wealth; neither of these is a result that
Rhode seeks. Of at least equal concern, increased regulation is likely
to demagnetize the lawyer's internal moral compass, which critics
have argued has already been seriously weakened. It is, moreover,
likely to intensify already disturbing trends of antagonism between
lawyer and client.
Let me step back from the argument in a couple of ways. First,
many of these issues are empirical ones, and I have only offered op-ed
page type of conjecture; this is a framework for thinking through
hypotheses and raising concerns, not an actual case. Second, both in
law and in medicine, there is sometimes a tendency to overromanticize the past professional world, and to underestimate the
significance of certain changes, including legal ones. I recognize that
the advent of informed consent law, for example, the loosening of
expert witness rules in that area, and the loosening of privity rules in
legal malpractice may present salutary developments. A much more
guarded account is needed. Third, and more defensively, I do not
think the argument I have offered is simply a hybrid of Kronman-like
Aristotelianism and libertarian anti-regulatory complaints.' Rather, I
am joining a literature both within contemporary-norms theory and
within the common law generally, which questions the wisdom of
using legal incentives to reshape our practices, without adequate
7. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 36-37 (1993).
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attention to the guiding power of non-legal norms within the relevant
communities. 8 Finally, given that I am not taking issue with Rhode's
demonstration of problems in the legal profession, it will be necessary
for me to say something about how those problems might be solved, if
not through different legal norms and incentives. My comments there
will be even slighter, but I will delay them until I have unpacked my
second set of concerns.
II. TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S
ACTIONS

A central feature of Rhode's book is the assertion that lawyers must
take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. 9 I think this
statement is implausibly broad in two distinct but interrelated ways.
First, it does not say which consequences they are responsible for, and
it is untenable to suppose that they are responsible for all of the
consequences of their actions. Thus, for example, if a matrimonial
lawyer assists an unhappily married couple in their early 60s in a
divorce, and a consequence of the divorce is that one of the adult
children commits suicide, it is far from clear that this consequence is
something that the attorney should take responsibility for. If a
criminal defense attorney gets her client acquitted, and the client then
commits a rape, it is not clear that the defense attorney is responsible
for this consequence, or that she should take responsibility for it.
Second, not all kinds of taking responsibility are the same. If a
large company does a public offering and an attorney provides advice
in regard to a prospectus sent to prospective investors, it may well be
that the attorney should take some responsibility for losses that
occurred because the prospectus contained some false statements.
But, if the attorney performed her job diligently and simply failed to
uncover the false statements, it is not clear why she should take
responsibility in the sense that an auditor who performed a negligent
audit should, or a client who negligently or intentionally misstated her
company's condition should take responsibility. The point that an
attorney cannot necessarily disclaim all responsibility does not mean
that the attorney's responsibility for consequences of conduct is, or
should be, the same as the client's responsibility.
Rhode is perhaps more interested in making a more negative, and
modest, statement about attorneys: a person who does work as an
attorney cannot disclaim responsibility for all of the consequences of
her conduct, merely by virtue of the fact that she is engaging in that
conduct in the role of attorney. To put the point in Kierkegaardian
dressing, attorneys should not suspend ethical judgment when acting
8. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer
Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1273, 1276 (1998).
9. Rhode, supra note 1, at 213.
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as attorneys. 10 Lawyers should engage in first-order moral judgment
in many scenarios as lawyers, rather than casting off all moral
judgment in order the more completely to adopt the role of the
lawyer. Yet, as Rhode herself points out in a number of places, a
moderate and tempered position is the key;" lawyers should not
necessarily act in avoidance of their role, and should not necessarily
act as if the decisions in question were their own moral choices in their
own lives.
The problem, then, is how to make progress in the articulation,
adumbration, and application of a moderate or intermediate position
regarding first-order moral and political judgments by lawyers.
Taking responsibility for all of the consequences of one's actions as a
lawyer, or taking responsibility for the actions as if they were one's
own, does not provide a tenable or defensible way of understanding
the lawyer's role.
Neither does the complete avoidance of
responsibility, or the dogmatic crafting of rules by which an attorney
may integrate her values as a matter of discretion in certain selective
situations.
Rhode's own position, as I understand it, is that
moderation and judgment are the answer to this question, as they are
in many other areas where both ends of a spectrum are clearly
wrong. 2 But-and I don't think Rhode would disagree-this is really
only the beginning of an answer, not the answer itself.
Contemporary analytic jurisprudence, particularly the work of
Ronald Dworkin, may provide some direction in thinking about these
issues. As numerous critics of Dworkin's jurisprudence have pointed
out, his theory is keyed almost entirely to the judicial role, rather than
to the question of what law itself is. (Of course, he himself does not
view these as in tension.) The starting point for Dworkin is how to
avoid a narrow positivist's strict separation between law and morality
on the one hand, and yet to remain clear of the position of the natural
law adherent who so thoroughly embraces the unity of law and
morality as to fail to produce a tenable account of the judge as having
a role distinct from lawmaker. 3 There is a parallel between this
challenge and the one that I take Rhode to have set up: we must now
reject the hard-nosed putative neutrality of the now-conventional
view of the legal profession. As I have briefly argued, however, this
does not mean we must eradicate the distinction between the lawyer
and the primary actor, or client; it does not mean that lawyer's
decisions are simply a subset of ethical decisions generally. Just as the
Dworkinian challenge in jurisprudence can be depicted as the
10. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, in Fear and Trembling and The
Sickness Unto Death (Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton University Press 1954) (1843)
(introducing the teleological suspension of the ethical).
11. Rhode, supra note 1, at 66-70.

12. Id at 67.
13. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 22-58 (1977).
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question of how a judge can reject the separation of law and morality,
even without morality swamping the law, so Rhode's challenge in
legal ethics is how a lawyer can reject the suspension of morality, even
without losing the distinction between her role as a lawyer and the
place of the client whom she is advising.
CONCLUSION

Of course, we all like to find unity in our thought and I am no
exception to this. I would like to think, therefore, that the two issues I
have raised may actually connect at a deeper level with one another.
For if we are to solve the problems raised by Rhode within the legal
profession without resorting to extra layers of regulation-as I have
suggested-we will need to think in the twenty-first century about
how to strengthen and revise the norms that guide the legal profession
internally. And, presumably, this must also be part of the answer to
the responsibility dilemma posed by Rhode: the concept of an
attorney's responsibility for what she does must be elaborated and
rethought in a manner that connects with the real events that her
conduct brings about, while distinguishing it from all the client does.
This too, will require an enriching and a rethinking of our professional
norms. Where, better, to begin to do this than in a laboratory of
students and academics in search of the interests of justice in the
twenty-first century?
I thank Deborah Rhode, my Fordham
colleagues, and all of you, for inviting me to tinker in this laboratory
with you.

